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INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

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Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Memorandum

Current Albanian Resistance Activities

Available evidence indicates that Albanian internal resistance, which is now faced with severe repressive measures, is not sufficiently strong to overthrow the Hoxha regime without considerable external support. Resistance activity, which increased noticeably during early 1951, is being encouraged externally by various non-Communist countries. In addition, Yugoslavia has recently furnished increased support to a pro-Tito Albanian resistance movement based in Yugoslavia. The divergent aims and mutual suspicions of the countries involved, however, hinder coordinated external support of the resistance potential in Albania.

The increasing anti-Hoxha activity in Albania was highlighted by the bombing of the Soviet Legation in Tirana by unknown agents on 19 February 1951. This incident had been preceded by sporadic acts of sabotage affecting factories, agricultural cooperatives and communication lines throughout the country. The bombing of the Soviet Legation resulted in a marked intensification of Communist repressive measures which may have increased the general discontent, but which, since March, have undoubtedly curtailed the resistance potential in terms of leaders, organization, and will to resist. The flight of numerous Albanians into Yugoslavia has been a parallel development.

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Resistance within Albania is supported from the West primarily through the National Committee for Free Albania, a coalition of emigre groups from Albania's two leading wartime non-Communist political parties, the Balli Kombetar and the pro-Zog Legaliteti, as well as the small Agrarian Party. The Committee, which was organized in 1949, has conducted sporadic airdrops of propaganda

leaflets into Albania with externally-based aircraft. It has been responsible for parachuting men and some supplies with the object of locating and assisting resistance activities.

The Committee has recruited resistance agents from the members of the various participating parties for training in subversive activities, and reportedly plans the total mobilization, when necessary, of all militarily fit Albanian refugees. However, a split between the right and left wings of the Balli Kombetar, the largest party in the National Committee for Free Albania, has hindered the effectiveness of this coalition.

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The Yugoslav Government has in recent months given strong support to the subversive activities of the 5,000 - 7,000 Albanian refugees who have escaped to Yugoslavia since the Tito-Cominform break. The Tito government has organized these refugees into an Albanian committee under the direction of the Yugoslav Communist Party and Security Police. The committee has reportedly been charged with smuggling propaganda and possibly small arms into Albania, consolidating resistance groups, and providing material aid to newly arrived Albanian refugees. Military units composed of Albanian exiles are reported to be receiving para-military training in Danilograd, Pristina and Prizren, Yugoslavia. This group allegedly plans the liberation of Albania through armed action by the Albanian refugees in Yugoslavia, assisted by the Albanian minority from the Kosovo region of Yugoslavia, estimated to number 700,000, with the Yugoslav Government supplying the necessary arms.

Yugoslav agents have also made overtures to Albanian exiles in the West, ostensibly to obtain Albanian leadership for Yugoslav subversive activities in Albania. The increased Yugoslav backing for Albanian refugee activities appears to be aimed largely at countering Western support of Albanian resistance, although it may also be designed to neutralize Albania in the event of a Satellite attack on Yugoslavia.

It is doubtful whether the Albanian resistance potential available to the Tito government within Yugoslavia would be capable of overthrowing the Albanian Government without the support of significant elements of the Albanian Army and anti-Hoxha groups in Albania. Moreover, because of Yugoslavia's currently vulnerable position, the Tito government probably has no immediate intention of attempting to upset the Cominform regime.